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Abstract
Deliberation research is nowundergoing two emerging trends: deliberation is shifting fromoffline to online, as well as from
an inherently democratic concept to the one applicable to less competitive regimes (He &Warren, 2011). The goal of this
article is to study the peculiarities of deliberative practices in hybrid regimes, taking online discourse on the Russian anti-
sanctions policy as a case. We use the Habermasian concept of basic validity claims to assess deliberation quality through
the lens of argumentation and interactivity. Our findings suggest that deliberative practices can exist in non-competitive
contexts and non-institutionalized digital spaces, in the form of intersubjective solidarities resulting from the everyday
political talk among ordinary citizens. Such deliberations can be counted as argumentative discourses, although in a spe-
cial, casual way—unlike the procedural rule-based debates. Generally, as in established liberal democracies, deliberation
in Russia tends to attract like-minded participants. While the argumentative quality does not seem to vary across the dis-
cussion threads sample, the level of deliberative interactivity is higher on pro-government media, accompanied with the
higher level of incivility. On the other hand, discourses on independent media are distinctively against the government pol-
icy of food destruction. The democratic value of such deliberations is unclear and might depend on the political allegiance
and ownership of the media. Though some discourses can be considered democratic, their impact on decision-making
remains minimal, which is a key constraint of deliberation.
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1. Introduction
Since its emergence, deliberation research has been
strongly associated with democracy as a goal of delib-
eration or at least an object of study. This democracy
quest has been then extended online (Friess & Eilders,
2015). Yet searching for deliberation in non-democratic
contexts, derived from the Chinese experience of citizen
engagement, is another emerging trend. The authoritar-
ian deliberation theory (He &Warren, 2011) has already
gone online (Jiang, 2010) and beyond China (Romano,
2018; Toepfl, 2018), and, furthermore, from spaces cre-
ated and totally controlled by governments to grass-
root deliberation practices (He, Tang, & Tamura, 2018,
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pp. 798–799; Medaglia & Yang, 2017; Medaglia & Zhu,
2017), which, however, remain underexplored due to
the lack of context-related research. Hence, we aim at
contributing to the authoritarian deliberation research
by exploring the peculiarities, opportunities and con-
straints of deliberative practices in non-democracies.
Our study differs from the most in authoritarian de-
liberation research in several respects. First, we take the
case of Russia, which has a different, hybrid modification
of regime known as electoral authoritarianism (Gel’man,
2015), i.e., the one that has certain ‘democratic’ insti-
tutions and limited political pluralism. Such pluralism is
still visible online, since the RuNet has been for a long
time developing relatively freely (Soldatov & Borogan,
2015). It allows us to assess and compare deliberation
processes and outcomes depending on the relationship
between the government and a certain outlet.
Secondly, we examine deliberative practices on sev-
eral online discussion platforms among ordinary, po-
litically non-organized citizens. In contrast to invited
spaces (Kersting, 2013) controlled by governments, such
discussions represent non-institutionalized (semi-) in-
vented virtual public spaces—or rather ‘third places’
(Wright, 2012)—where members of the public engage in
computer-mediated communications to discuss salient
issues freely. Here we distinguish the media outlets
themselves (that can be under direct or indirect govern-
ment influence) from the online discussions they host
(which are free from such control, as there is no evidence
that such discussions are coerced ormanipulated—there
is no lack of criticism towards authorities on other is-
sues in the past discussions as well). In this view, our
aim is to better understand whether deliberation qual-
ity and outcomes would differ across online discussion
platforms depending on the political affiliation of their
host owners.
Thirdly, we choose one highly politically and morally
sensitive issue, namely, the discussion of destroying
Western food under embargo following the Russian
counter-sanctions policy, to study such discussions from
a deliberation perspective; the latter includes such fea-
tures as civility, interactivity, argumentation and the pre-
vailing positions towards the food destruction policy. In
doing so, we start with the review of existing theories
on deliberation and authoritarian deliberation, followed
by the elaboration of research methodology, describing
the deliberation standard, against which the discussion
content was coded. Then we present the empirical case
study. The article ends by demonstrating and discussing
the research findings.
2. Reconceptualizing Deliberation in the Internet Era
2.1. Democratic Value of Deliberation as Argumentative
Reason
As theorized by Jurgen Habermas, deliberation is a
deeply democratic phenomenon within the (idealized)
concept of the public sphere and participatory democ-
racy (Bohman & Rehg, 1997, p. XII; Habermas, 1992a).
His theories of discourse ethics and communicative
action decouple the Kantian notion of reason and
will-formation from the subjective selves of individu-
als into the discursively (and collectively) constructed
intersubjective solidarities formed during deliberation
(Habermas, 1984, 1987, 2006). In this interpretation, de-
liberation broadens itsmeaning to include everyday com-
municative practices among ordinary citizens. Habermas
calls such practices ‘practical discourses’ where citizens
are engaged in truth-tracking moral discussions to un-
derstand others by making claims to validity (Habermas,
1992b, pp. 52, 103, 122). Habermas (1992a, p. 19) argues,
for example, that:
Everyday communication makes possible a kind of un-
derstanding that is based on claims to validity and
thus furnishes the only real alternative to exerting in-
fluence on one another in more or less coercive ways.
The validity claims that we raise in conversation—
that is, when we say something with conviction—
transcend this specific conversational context, point-
ing to something beyond the spatiotemporal ambit of
the occasion. Every agreement, whether produced for
the first time or reaffirmed, is based on (controvert-
ible) grounds of reason. Grounds have a special prop-
erty: they force us into yes or no positions.
‘Yes’ and ‘No’ positions emerge when discourse partic-
ipants make the basic claim to the validity of shared
values, ‘intersubjective’ normative rightness (Habermas,
1987, pp. 313–314, 1984, p. 52). Being aware of this way
of reasoning encourages citizens to respond by validating
such claims and displaying the reason behind ‘Yes’ and
‘No’ positions. Habermas (1984, p. 31) specifically argues
that ‘the theory of argumentation must be equipped
with a more comprehensive concept of validity that is
not restricted to validity in the sense of truth’. It is the
hearer who ultimately decides which claims seem ‘truth-
ful’ to be validated by agreement or disagreement on the
basis of universal or group moral and ethical standards.
In the Habermasian tradition, deliberation is a par-
ticipatory form of politically, morally, and ethically justi-
fied discourse when citizens voluntarily discuss politics
in a casual manner to present competing perspectives
through public reasoning instead of bargaining; the latter
is typical for the pluralist democratic model (Bohman &
Rehg, 1997, pp. XII–XIII). They claim that decision-making
should not result from the economics of the rational-
choice approach, but from public deliberation, from a
communicatively constructed public will, so as demo-
cratic policies accommodate not only competing group
interests, but also the commonly shared public values
(Bohman, 1996; Elster, 1998). Gutmann and Thompson
(2004), for example, define deliberative democracy as a
‘need to justify decisions made by citizens and their rep-
resentatives’ through exchanging reasons among ‘free
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and equal persons seeking fair terms of cooperation’
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004, p. 3). However, Dryzek
(2000) questions the view that deliberation should be
associated with discussions that are (unnaturally) calm,
reasoned, argumentative, whereas the genuine commu-
nication in democracy should include the real-life discur-
sive processes that are intrinsically social, intersubjective
invoking all kinds of ‘unruly and contentious communica-
tions from the margin’ (Dryzek, 2000, p. VI). Mutz (2006)
and Gastil (2008) concur that the routine political con-
versations between neighbors, family members or co-
workers are to be counted as the core deliberation prac-
tice in the common public sphere.
While some are skeptical that the Internet im-
proves democratic deliberation (Sunstein, 2009), others
(Coleman, 2017) believe that it is not about the Inter-
net which just offers new opportunities for strengthen-
ing democracy, but it is rather our failure to benefit from
such democratic opportunities. Even in democracy, citi-
zens with similar political views develop unhealthy frag-
mentation and group polarization leading to the ‘like-
minded enclaves’ and ‘eventually to a polarized opinion
climate in the whole society’ (Strandberg, Himmelroos,
& Grönlund, 2019, p. 12). Jonsson and Åström (2014,
p. 1) in their review of the online deliberation research
acknowledge the belief that whilst the idealized version
of ‘pure deliberation’ has not yet been realized online,
it is an expanding field trying ‘to re-link deliberative the-
ory with empirical political science’ in a hope to address
these fears.We support a view that empirical evidence is
still scarce to clarifymore credibly the link between delib-
eration as a real-life practice and public politics well be-
yond governing practices of western liberal democracies.
2.2. Authoritarian Deliberation: From Invented to
(Semi-)Invited Spaces
Although the media freedom subversion is a common
trait of non-democracies, its intensity differs across
regimes (Stier, 2015) and goes beyond total censor-
ship to more liberated forms (Huang, Boranbay-Akan,
& Huang, 2019; Stafford, 2017), with a vast repertoire
of control over officially independent outlets (Schedler,
2009). Such strategies can be found on the Internet
as well, when filtering and censorship are masterfully
combined with citizens’ input and free discussion to en-
sure regime stability (Gunitsky, 2015). This observation
is quite in line with the trend of making citizens’ input a
source of authoritarian stability (Gerschewski, 2013), in-
cluding online participation (Åström, Karlsson, Linde, &
Pirannejad, 2012).
These tendencies give rise to the concept of author-
itarian deliberation (He & Warren, 2011) that combines
deliberative governance with non-democratic power dis-
tribution. Assuming that deliberation and democracy are
conceptually and empirically distinct, the authors define
deliberative authoritarianism as ‘a form of rule in which
powers of decision are concentrated, but power holders
enable communicative contexts that generate influence
(responsiveness to claims and reasons) among the par-
ticipants’ (He & Warren, 2011, pp. 273–274). The demo-
cratic value of such initiatives is questionable (Tong & He,
2018), but it is argued that governments tend to ensure
somewhat workable mechanisms of deliberation (He &
Wagenaar, 2018).
While most authoritarian deliberation research is
concentrated on state—created (invited) public spaces,
less attention is given to non-institutionalized, invented
or semi-invented spaces, like the social media (Jiang,
2010; Medaglia & Zhu, 2017), or news websites com-
ment sections (Toepfl & Litvinenko, 2018), which are cen-
tral to our research. What can be expected from such
spaces in terms of deliberation? Here we propose sev-
eral scenarios to be checked.
The first one is that comment sections are a mere re-
verberation of the governmental discourse to legitimize
propaganda by ‘public opinion’, through various astro-
turfing techniques (Han, 2015) and messages modera-
tion by the media outlets (Toepfl & Litvinenko, 2018).
The citizens with opposite views may refrain from en-
gaging into such discussions due to self-censorship, fear
and similar reasons. However, and this is the second sce-
nario, a sort of free polarized discussion may also be
of practical use for incumbents. As shown by Chen and
Xu (2017), dictators may use public communication ei-
ther to get feedback on policies, or to prevent collec-
tive actions by making citizens divide on policies and
blame each other, not the government. In the third sce-
nario wemay expect to find ‘democratic enclaves’ (Gilley,
2010)—autonomous spaces that can be used by oppo-
sition activists and like-minded people to discuss poli-
tics, but their scale is too small to pose a challenge to
regime stability. Although they have some democrati-
zation potential, the recent trends suggest such spaces
rather contribute to the regime resilience (Kabanov &
Romanov, 2017).
We argue that all three scenarios eventually lead to
regime strengthening. But the question of their deliber-
ation quality, in terms of discourse outcomes and domi-
nant positions, remains open. We hypothesize that in the
first and third cases we are more likely to view homoge-
neous discourseswith dominance of pro- and anti-govern-
ment positions accordingly. The second case would prob-
ably allow more polarization and heterogeneity.
Due to the media fragmentation, we further hy-
pothesize that such outcomes differ across the outlets,
depending on their relationship with the government
and degree of loyalty. The scenarios we outline might
probably shift from the dominance of pro-government
discourse to more polarized views and finally to anti-
government discourses. This tendency can be further re-
inforced by the ‘like-minded enclave’ effect (Strandberg
et al., 2019)whenpeople seek like-mindedpeople to sup-
port their viewpoint.
The empirical research of such regime-dependent pe-
culiarities is distorted by the general trends in delibera-
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tion and media consumption. First, it is usually observed
that such news comment sections lack civility, respect
and deliberation whatsoever (Zamith & Lewis, 2014).
Secondly, a variety of deliberation outcomes can be ex-
plained not only by the political orientation of the outlet,
but also by the design of the comment section (Aragón,
Gómez, & Kaltenbrunner, 2017; Rowe, 2015). These lim-
itations should be taken into consideration when inter-
preting the results.
3. Research Design and Method
3.1. Case Study, Sample and Research Questions
The case study for the research is based on analyzing five
online discussions among Russian citizens on just one is-
sue of the Russian anti-sanctions policy, namely, the so-
cial consequences of the government decision to destroy
the embargoed food imported from the West. The deci-
sion to seize western food was taken in August 2015 in
a form of the presidential decree, provoking public de-
bates on its efficiency, morality and rationality. Several e-
petitionswere cast to ban food destruction, including the
one on the Change.org where it was signed by over 500
thousand people (https://goo.gl/FaSEDe). The issue was
discussed very widely across the Russian online media.
The choice of these online debates was determined
by the following factors. Firstly, there was a need to
limit the coding samplewith some 500 posted comments
which was realistic to process due to the complexity
of content coding, including the availability of trained
coders and a need to cross-check the coding results. It
was assumed that five discussions containing about 100
comments each would be feasible to code and analyze.
From the previous research, we knew that large num-
bers of comments do not necessarily improve delibera-
tive quality, whereas several dozens of comments could
be sufficient to capture the discussion essence. Secondly,
as Russia does not have its official national or local e-
Democracy or e-Participation platforms designed specif-
ically to engage citizens in deliberation practices, we fo-
cused on choosing among the prominent national media
that were actively reporting on food destruction when it
started in August 2015 and thus attracting attention of
wide audience within Russia. Typically, these were pop-
ular television channels that aired graphic video reports
showing how the seized food was destroyed by bulldoz-
ers and incinerated (which was a very unusual experi-
ence to see for many Russian viewers). Thirdly, the inten-
tion was to choose a diverse set of media that would in-
clude both television and newspapers, both Russian and
international, both clearly pro-government and clearly
independent. And, fourthly, we wanted to ensure that
the discussions themselves are not explicitly dependent
on or influenced by their media hosts and, therefore, un-
dertook a preliminary review of the previously hosted
discussions to be sure that there was no visible evidence
of such influence—on the contrary, there were many
negative comments made by visitors in relation to au-
thorities and their policies despite being hosted by the
government-owned media; making such distinction was
essential for this research.
The chosen discussions and respective media hosts
are listed in Table 1.
The sample includes two national clearly pro-
government television channels that had active com-
ment sections (national coverage was important for
greater outreach) and were quick to report about
food destruction; namely: the Russia Today (a Russian-
language service) and the NTV. The selection of these
Table 1. List of media hosts.
Media hosts Media type Seed material / Lead article Number of posted Date of access
comments
Change.org e-petition International, Don’tCrashFood Update: We 76 30 August 2015
website independent will achieve our goal! Preparing
a conference (Savelyeva, 2015)
Business Gazette Vzglayd Russian, pro- Polish Minister writes to Putin 161 7 August 2015
www.vz.ru government calling food destruction a sin
(Vzglayd Business Gazette, 2015)
Russia Today TV channel Russian Dmitry Peskov’s (President Putin’s 34 5 August 2015
www.rt.com government- press representative) comments
owned on the reaction following the
destruction of embargoed food
(Russia Today TV, 2015)
Gamers’ Playground Forum Russian, Destruction of embargoed food 74 8 August 2015
www.PlayGround.ru independent (Gamers’ Playground Forum, 2015)
NTV TV Russian, Tons of cheese and tomato are 160 6 August 2015
www.ntv.ru government- destroyed with the help special
owned machinery (NTV, 2015)
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specific channels was also justified by the fact that
Russia Today is a global broadcaster. In addition to these
strongly pro-government television channels, one online
newspaper the Vzglayd was added to the sample as a
nominally business-oriented non-political media outlet.
While the newspaper positions itself as an online edi-
tion for business people, its discussion forum is popular
with casual visitors as well. The newspaper’s owner is
a Moscow-based social and economic research think-
tank closely linked to the government (but not explicitly
government-owned) and advocates for the government
policy agenda. The remaining two media were chosen
among those resources that are clearly independent
from the government influence and control. One was
a popular Russian-language version of the Change.org e-
petition portal which allows its users to discuss the sub-
mitted petitions, including a petition to stop destructing
food which collected almost half-a-million supporters;
hence, it was logical to include this media into the coding
sample. The fifth chosen online discussion took place on
the website, most popular among the Russian gamers—
the Playground (in fact, a gaming server with over two
million of registered users). Its advantage was that it dif-
fered from others being politically neutral (hosted by the
Internet provider the RopNet).
When composing the coding sample, we were
well aware about its limitations understanding that
there could have been other candidates to consider as
well. However, the existing scholarship on computer-
mediated deliberation does not provide any conclusive
guidance on how to compose such samples, especially in
the hybrid political context and in view of the unclear link
between the media host and deliberation itself. As Sand-
fort and Quick (2017, p. 1) note, ‘no single dimension
explains success or failure; the results of deliberation
arise through a complex mixing of contextual and design
features’. Apart from the above-mentioned selection fac-
tors, we intentionally chose to a certain extent random
sample as an instant snap-shot of a far wider and deeper
public debate that was unfolding on the Russian Internet.
At the same time, we did not seek to construct a repre-
sentative sample in a traditional sociological sense, as-
suming thatwas impossiblemethodologically and techni-
cally. Furthermore, we did not attempt to measure pub-
lic opinion, as surveys do, but instead tomeasure deliber-
ation quality and outcome by revealing the discursively
and intersubjectively constructed attitudes towards food
destruction at a certain time and on the certain media
through ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ positions in a Habermasian tradi-
tion, as stated above. The aim was to investigate how
practical reasoning was discursively applied by partici-
pants to advance particular morally and ethically justi-
fied (via claims to validity) positions (contrary to distill-
ing public opinion that does not require social interaction
among subjects).
The research aimed at accomplishing two interre-
lated objectives: (1) to test a proposed deliberation met-
rics (standard) for examining casual political conversa-
tions on a salient public policy issue; and (2) to under-
stand how deliberation quality differs depending on the
media hosts’ political allegiances. These objectives were
supported by the following seven research questions:
RQ1: Are the online debates on pro-government me-
dia less civil than those on independent media?
RQ2: Can the messages posted on discussion threads
be considered both argumentative and rational?
RQ3: Do the discourses on the independent media
demonstrate higher rationality and argumentation
compared with those on pro-government media?
RQ4: Is interactivity driven by agreements or
disagreements?
RQ5: Do disagreements lead to more ‘Against’
positions, while agreements generate more ‘For’
positions?
RQ6: Does interactivity influence position-taking—
‘For’ or ‘Against’?
RQ7: Does the pro-government or independent sta-
tus of the media hosting online discussion influence
deliberative quality?
3.2. Method
Asmentioned above, the researchmethod was based on
content coding to reveal the Habermasian claims to va-
lidity of normative rightness present in discussion con-
tent, i.e., in the comments posted by discussion partic-
ipants (Misnikov, 2013). The revealed validated claims
were further coded to describe the various parameters
of discourse quality grouped into three deliberative stan-
dards: (a) interactivity, (b) civility and (c) argumentation.
While argumentation and civility are well studied, inter-
activity has not been examined sufficiently. We gener-
ally accept the definition of interactivity given by Rafaeli
and Sudweeks (1997, 1998) focusing on the presence of
a particular topic across a certain range of comments,
i.e., a certain continuitywhen interactivity increaseswith
the increase of the number of posts containing refer-
ences to the same topic. That is typically done among
the interacting participants when they respond to one
another’s messages.We consider intersubjective interac-
tivity central to deliberation quality and propose to use
a term interactive deliberation to underline the concep-
tual and practical importance of interactivity for delib-
eration. It was coded through agreements or disagree-
ments that participants applied tomake their own claims
to validity and validate others’ claims to display support
or rejection of food destruction policy in the form of
‘For’ and ‘Against’ positions. In other words, interactiv-
ity interlinks at least two messages. For example, the
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more messages are involved in one line of argumenta-
tion, the more interactive this part of discourse is. There
are always other posts that are not necessarily validated
through agreement-disagreement or those that deviate
from the topic of food destruction; such posts were ex-
cluded from the analysis.
The interactivity standard addressed:
• Claims to normative rightness validated via di-
rect and indirect response to other messages and
to a discussion source that initiated the discus-
sion by agreeing–disagreeing with the meaning of
the message;
• Claims to normative rightness validated via direct
and indirect response to other messages only;
• Containing interactively expressed disagreements
revealing ‘For’ and ‘Against’ positions with regard
to food destruction policy;
• Containing interactively expressed agreements re-
vealing ‘For’ and ‘Against’ positions with regard to
food destruction policy.
The argumentation standard included references to:
• Subjective conclusions, analysis, inferences, rea-
soning, questioning, generalizations except decla-
rations without justification;
• Any subjective recommendations, proposals,
actions;
• Any examples, cases, comparisons, events,
proverbs, dates;
• Objective facts (narrative, numerical);
• Any figures (except dates).
The civility standard coded only the explicitly: (a) rude,
uncivil, derogatory, personally offensive language; and
(b) expressly polite and accommodating messages.
The discussions were also checked in terms of their
participatory equality to ensure that these were not ‘hi-
jacked’ by few dominant participants. Overall, 333 partic-
ipants posted 503 messages, which means that each par-
ticipant on average posted 1 or 2 messages. Also, while
there were some variations across the discussions (see
Table 2), these were minor meaning that the discussions
were quite equal and there were no participants that
dominated them.
For ethical and privacy reasons, we did not process
in any way the participants’ names (nicks) that were at-
tached to their posts and never attempted to know their
real names or profiles.
4. Research Results
4.1. Argumentation
As described above, coding argumentation involved re-
vealing five deliberative parameters: reasoning, recom-
mendations, cases, facts and figures. At least four of five
posted messages contained some sort of argumentation
and reasoning regardless of the media type. The overall
level of argumentation is high across all the discussions.
Even a small sample pertaining to the discussion hosted
by the Russia Today TV channel is part of this trend. The
distribution pattern of five argumentation parameters
(depicted in Figure 1) reveals that making references to
subjective conclusions, analysis, inferences, questioning
and generalizations are by far the most common way of
reasoning for all five discussions—almost every second
posts contained some sort of reasoning and argumenta-
tion (47%).
This category is followed by the mention of compar-
isons, cases, events (22% of all posted messages) and
a group of posts containing recommendations, propos-
als, suggestions (16%)—themiddle of the argumentation
pyramid. The use of objective facts (the ones that are
hard to dispute—part of the Habermasian claims to va-
lidity of the second type describing the objective world)
and figures as arguments were in minority—10% and
4% accordingly.
The data broken down by the hostmedia political sta-
tus do not yield any difference showing essentially the
same levels and patterns (see Figure 2).
While the use of conclusions and other forms of rea-
soning appears to be a standard practice regardless of
the media’s political allegiance and affiliation, it should
be noted that due to the casual character of the every-
day political talk online, reasoning takes a loose form
that does not assume presenting hard facts and justifi-
cation for each instance of argumentation every time
the post is written. This is a rather typical way of the
casual opinion expression and argumentation based on
some unproven facts or events, interpreted in a partic-
Table 2. Distribution of participants by posted comments.
1 2–4 5–9 10 + Average number of comments
Discussion Comment Comments Comments Comments per participants
Gamers Playground forum 76% 16% 8% 3% 2
RT TV channel 86% 14% 0% 0% 1
NTV channel 86% 14% 0% 0% 1
Business Gazette Vzglyad 64% 30% 2% 2% 2
Change.org 81% 18% 0% 0% 1
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Distribuon of argumentaon types—all discourses
39ﬁgures
facts
recommendaons, proposals
comparisons, cases, events
conclusions, reasoning, generalizaons
81
126
175
371
Figure 1. Distribution of argumentation type.
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conclusions,
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22%
48% 44%15% 17%
10%
5% 5%
10%
22%
Figure 2. Use of argumentation on pro-government and independent media.
ular way—sort of a ‘light’ reasoning with references to
common assumptions that are believed by the author to
be shared by many. This is in effect a form of an argu-
ment. For example, the post says that ‘smuggling with
the contraband into Russia as a way of tax avoidance
is not a sin, while the destruction of such contraband
is a sin…’ (Business Gazette Vzglayd, 2015). On the sur-
face, this utterance looks like a mere statement not sup-
ported by specific evidence. Yet this is actually a (rhetor-
ical) question asking the reader to contemplate about
morality of food destruction; that is, whether this is sin-
ful or not? The argument draws on a comparison with a
common background knowledge in Russia, presumably
shared by many, that if smuggling food into Russia to
avoid paying taxes is not considered a sin (although no ev-
idence offered to support this claim about smuggling as
something ‘normal’ and certainly not a sin), then why its
destruction should be sinful? Comparing with something
commonly known is the argument deployed by the par-
ticipant to convince others that destroying food is ‘nor-
mal’. Yet others disagree claiming that even the contra-
band can be re-sold or utilized in other less dramatic
ways, especially food. This kind of reasoning is ubiquitous
across the discussion. Sometimes such conclusions are
supported by recommendations and comparisons or ref-
erences to other cases to make the argument stronger.
Use of proven facts is not widespread. However, it is
hard to imagine a debate among ordinary people where
each participant presents facts. That does not make dis-
cussion irrational or unreasoned, since it is the mean-
ing and interaction that matter in both moral and prag-
matic discourses.
Two conclusions one might make based on the re-
sults of coding argumentation. One is that the presence
of any type of reasoning does not constitute a delibera-
tive feature of a special democratic significance. On the
contrary, it is likely a standard behavior in an online de-
bate among lay people who are interested in discussing
politics in a public manner. The other finding is that such
argumentation is inherent in this type of debates.
4.2. Civility
Civilitywas coded to reveal both the expressly civil, polite
posts and those that are explicitly uncivil—rude, deroga-
tory, offensive, highly personal. However, the coding re-
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sults did not show any significant number of the visibly
polite posts. In contrast, as Figure 3 demonstrates, uncivil
posts were common on pro-government media (25%),
particularly on the NTV channel (30%). Discussions on
the independent media were more civil, with just one
in ten posts being uncivil. The higher negative emotion
(typically the personally addressed messages with little
substance)might be indicative of contentious debates on
the state-controlled media that attract more diverse au-
dience than on independentmedia which aremore likely
to attract like-minded participants critical of the food de-
struction policy.
4.3. Interactivity
Interactivity was coded to show how many claims to
normative rightness were validated (as a percentage of
all posted messages); how many of them were interac-
tive either via agreement or disagreement; and which of
these supported and rejected the policy of food destruc-
tion (see Figures 4, 5 and 6).
The overall level of deliberative interactivity (Fig-
ure 4), measured as claim validation, is between 57% on
independent media and 77% on pro-government, with
the level of validation reaching as much as 88% on the
Russian Today TV channel and as low as 47% on the
Gamers’ Forum. The higher interactivity of the latter
might be an effect of the more contentious type of de-
bate there when disparities in views lead to more in-
teraction. However, that link needs further examination
and additional evidence to prove or disprove it. In any
case, both cases demonstrate a rather high level of reci-
procity among participants for a casual talk discussing
just one topic of food destruction (other topic were not
coded). Larger differences emerge when it comes to the
use of agreements and disagreements when validating
the claims made (see Figure 5). For example, interactive
disagreements are noticeably higher among the state-
controlled media ranging from 68% in the case of the
NTV channel to 39% on the website of the Vzglyad (the
average is 56%). While this difference is substantial, it
is still smaller than the level of disagreement on the in-
dependent media—29% (18% for the discussion on the
Change.org and 24% on the Gamers’ Forum). In a similar
vein, the use of deliberative agreements is even stronger
on the independent media—82% on the Change.org and
76%on theGamers’ Forumagainst 41%on Russian Today
and 32% on the NTV. It is not clear what causes such
differentiation. Agreements and disagreements are just
discursive instruments to claim something or validate
other claims to reveal a position or an opinion. Techni-
cally speaking, it does not matter whether the rejection
of food destruction is materialized through agreeing or
disagreeing. The process of coding agreements and dis-
post of moderate,
acceptable civilitypost of moderate,
acceptable civility
explicity uncivil, unacceptable posts:
rude, derogatory, oﬀensive, personal
explicity uncivil,
unacceptable posts:
rude, derogatory,
oﬀensive, personal
Civility on pro-government media Civility on independent media
75% 91%
25%
9%
Figure 3. Civility on pro-government and independent media.
unvalidated
messages
validated messages via
agreement-disagreement
Validaon on pro-government media
23%
77%
unvalidated
messages
validated messages via
agreement-disagreement
Validaon on independent media
43%
57%
Figure 4. Validation of claims to normative rightness on pro-government and independent media.
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interacve
agreements
interacve
disagreements
Interacve agreements and disagreements
on pro-government media
44%
56%
interacve
agreements
interacve
disagreements
Interacve agreements and disagreements
on independent media
20%
80%
Figure 5. Interactive agreements and disagreements on pro-government and independent media.
agreements was linked to the claim making and valida-
tion process which allows focusing only on the most re-
cent acts of agreement-disagreement related validations.
More research would be needed to provide a plausi-
ble explanation why the pro-government media demon-
strate more contentious type of public discourse com-
pared with the independent media. We can hypothesize,
however, drawing on other research, that on the surface
it looks like a manifestation of the ‘like-minded enclave’
(Strandberg et al., 2019) or the impact of the homophily
factor prompting the emergence of the like-minded soli-
darities (Mutz, 2006) on the independent media among
those who do not trust the pro-government media and
choose alternative places to express disapproval of the
food destruction policy. Naturally, the level of disagree-
ment among the like-minded people is expected to be
lower on such a morally loaded issue.
Figure 6 reveals the discursively formed intersub-
jective solidarities of discussants differing in their atti-
tude towards the policy of food destruction. There is
a strong correlation—although not necessarily a cause–
effect relationship—between the media political alle-
giances and the attitude to food destruction. Participants
on the independent media reject overwhelmingly food
destruction (for in five are against), while the balance on
the pro-government media is more muted with roughly
one half being in favor with the other half against. It
seems that while the independent media may be seen
morally superior in its protest against food destruction,
it also signals about the ‘like-minded enclave’ syndrome.
On the other hand, the pro-government media demon-
strate more diverse debate in supporting the policy of
food destruction.
5. Discussion
We argue that our study contributes to the existing lit-
erature on authoritarian deliberation in several ways.
First, the research echoes the assumption (He &Warren,
2011) that deliberation and democracy are conceptually
and empirically discernable phenomena: the formermay
exist across different political regimes and institutional
settings. The lack of political pluralism should not be
simply considered a counter-indication for deliberation,
rather an important object of study within deliberation
research theories and methods, previously designed for
democracies only.
Secondly, deliberation in autocracies is not limited to
the government-created and -led domains, designed to
support decision-making and facilitate information gath-
ering (He & Warren, 2011). Our research shows that de-
liberative practices in non-competitive contexts may ex-
AGAINST food
destrucon
AGAINST food
destrucon
FOR food
destrucon
FOR food
destrucon
Atude towards food destrucon policy
in pro-government media
Atude towards food destrucon policy
on independent media
46%
54%
17%
83%
Figure 6. Intersubjective solidarities ‘For’ and ‘Against’ food destruction on pro-government and independent media.
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ist in ‘semi-invented’ spaces, although patterns and qual-
ity of deliberation vary, depending on the political affil-
iation of the outlets. That speaks for expanding the au-
thoritarian deliberation framework to a larger set of on-
line platforms. The methodology proposed in this study
might be a useful tool for such analysis.
At the same time, one should not overestimate
the potential of such deliberation to influence decision-
making or contribute to democratization. Rather it pro-
vides several additional mechanisms of the regime
resilience. Out of the three scenarios mentioned in
Section 2.2, our research reveals the second and the
third one. Discussions on the pro-government media
do not hold exclusively the pro-government discourse,
but equal proportions of those supporting and opposing
food destruction. Rather than being a tool of direct pro-
paganda, they represent a space for disagreement and
polarization, intensified by higher rated uncivility and of-
fensive utterances (RQ1).
The clear dominance of the anti-policy discourse in
the independent media exemplifies the ‘democratic en-
clave’ (Gilley, 2010) scenario, but can also present the
‘like-minded enclave’ effect (Strandberg et al., 2019).
Such ‘enclaves’ are unlikely to become drivers of democ-
ratization, or at least, ‘schools’ of deliberative democ-
racy. Even though there is a clear link between anti-policy
discourse in the independent media and a strong focus
on interactive agreements, there is no visible connection
between the deliberation quality and the media’s politi-
cal stance (RQ7).
Hence, both scenarios help the authoritarian regime
to be stable: while polarization helps autocrats to amor-
tize the negative effects of an unpopular policy (Chen
& Xu, 2017), the ‘enclaves’ channel the discontent in a
‘safe’ manner.
However, other tested criteria of deliberation are
quite equally present across platforms (RQ3). As for ra-
tionality and argumentation (RQ1), the coding results re-
veal that as many as four of five messages contain some
sort of reasoning. The use of objective facts is minimal
across the media. The casual format of argumentation
should not be confused with the logic typical to expert
talks, but it is also accepted by other participants, and
the level of argumentation in various media seems al-
most identical.
The available evidence suggests that neither agree-
ment nor disagreement determine how interactive the
discussion is (RQ4)—with roughly the same level of de-
liberative interactivity, the level of agreements and dis-
agreements vary vastly across the media. Nor is there ev-
idence to suggest that there is a clear pattern pointing
at the existence of a link between agreeing–disagreeing
and position-taking. The respective parameters differ
greatly (RQ5). Finally, no relationship has been discerned
between interactivity and how often discourse partici-
pants take a position ‘For’ or ‘Against’ food destruction
policy (RQ6). Generally, the overall interactivity has not
demonstrated high variability.
6. Conclusion
Our findings suggest that authoritarian deliberation is a
promising research domain within a general deliberation
research, which furthermore contributes to our under-
standing of the contemporary nature of non-democratic
rule (Gerschewski, 2013). At the same time, the shift
from invented to (semi-)invited spaces raises some theo-
retical and methodological complications. First, it is hard
to reveal the influence of authoritarian incumbents on
the process and outcomes of deliberation, as this effect
is distorted by private actors: media owners and citizens
themselves. Secondly, while the effect of government-
led discussions on policy outcomes can be measured, it
is hard to trace the influence of informal discourse on
policy change. As our case suggested, such deliberation
occurred after the decision had already been taken, and
even if it had been held before, the government would
have had enormous discretion of taking those opinions
into account. Thirdly, it might be problematic to estimate
the sample needed for assessing the deliberative poten-
tial of the Internet: our 5 outlets represent only a mi-
nor segment of the online public discourse, and it is un-
clear whether it is enough to draw meaningful conclu-
sions. Finally, as deliberation is a very complex concept,
more deliberation criteria should be taken into account.
We hope that this research can become a step towards
resolution of these problems and developing practical so-
lutions for deliberation to becomemeaningful regardless
of the political regime.
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